The Microeconomics Seminar: Every Wednesday at 12:15 pm.

Time: 12:00 pm – 1:15 pm
Date: 14th of February 2018
Place: Room 3001.

Alon EIZENBERG (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “The Dynamics of Technology Adoption and Vertical Restraints: an Empirical Analysis” with Andràs Péchy and Michelle Sovinsky

Abstract: This paper examines an aspect of exclusive deals (and other vertical constraints) that has not, to the best of our knowledge, been addressed by the literature: their dynamic effects. We document these effects in the x86 processor industry, where Intel, a dominant upstream supplier, competes with a smaller contender, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). During the studied period, Intel offered downstream clients rebates and subsidies that were conditioned on the volume purchased from it and, sometimes, on the volume purchased from AMD. Our results indicate that the adoption of the AMD technology by a given downstream client was negatively affected by restrictions imposed on other clients. Furthermore, adoption was an increasing function of both the intensity of antitrust litigation against Intel’s exclusionary practices, and AMD’s production capacity. Taken together, these results imply that by striking exclusive deals with some downstream clients, a dominant upstream supplier may discourage adoption of a rival technology by (i) denying the rival from obtaining cashflow needed for investment in expanding its production capacity, and (ii) affecting clients’ expectations regarding the rival’s future market position. Competition authorities should pay particular attention to market dynamics when assessing the potential anticompetitive effects of exclusionary contracts.

 
Link to the paper

Organizers:
Marie-Laure Allain, Pierre Boyer, Laurent Linnemer  &  Morgane Cure (CREST)

Sponsors:
CREST

Food is provided.

The Microeconomics Seminar: Every Wednesday at 12:15 pm.

Time: 12:00 pm – 1:15 pm
Date: 14th of February 2018
Place: Room 3001.

Alon EIZENBERG (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) – “The Dynamics of Technology Adoption and Vertical Restraints: an Empirical Analysis” with Andràs Péchy and Michelle Sovinsky

Abstract: This paper examines an aspect of exclusive deals (and other vertical constraints) that has not, to the best of our knowledge, been addressed by the literature: their dynamic effects. We document these effects in the x86 processor industry, where Intel, a dominant upstream supplier, competes with a smaller contender, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). During the studied period, Intel offered downstream clients rebates and subsidies that were conditioned on the volume purchased from it and, sometimes, on the volume purchased from AMD. Our results indicate that the adoption of the AMD technology by a given downstream client was negatively affected by restrictions imposed on other clients. Furthermore, adoption was an increasing function of both the intensity of antitrust litigation against Intel’s exclusionary practices, and AMD’s production capacity. Taken together, these results imply that by striking exclusive deals with some downstream clients, a dominant upstream supplier may discourage adoption of a rival technology by (i) denying the rival from obtaining cashflow needed for investment in expanding its production capacity, and (ii) affecting clients’ expectations regarding the rival’s future market position. Competition authorities should pay particular attention to market dynamics when assessing the potential anticompetitive effects of exclusionary contracts.

 
Link to the paper

Organizers:
Marie-Laure Allain, Pierre Boyer, Laurent Linnemer  &  Morgane Cure (CREST)

Sponsors:
CREST

Food is provided.