BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Department of Economics | IP Paris - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics | IP Paris
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://econ.ip-paris.fr
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics | IP Paris
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20230326T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20231029T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20230103T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20230103T133000
DTSTAMP:20260408T031744
CREATED:20230102T163659Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230102T163659Z
UID:14673-1672748100-1672752600@econ.ip-paris.fr
SUMMARY:Andrea Canidio (IMT school of advanced studies\, Lucca\, Italy) "Auctions with Tokens"
DESCRIPTION:The Macroeconomics Seminar:\nTime: 12:15 pm – 13:30 pm\nDate: 03th of January 2023 \nZoom \nAndrea Canidio (IMT school of advanced studies\, Lucca\, Italy) \nTitle : “Auctions with Tokens” \nAbstract : “In a repeated\, private-value auction\, the auctioneer accepts payments in a blockchain-based token he creates and initially owns.  I show that the present-discounted value of the expected revenues is the same as in a standard auction with dollars\, but these revenues accrue earlier and are less variable. I then introduce non-contractible effort and the possibility of misappropriating revenues. I compare the auction with tokens to an auction with dollars in which the auctioneer can also issue a financial security. An auction with tokens is preferred when there are sufficiently severe contracting frictions\, while the opposite is true when contracting frictions are low.” \nOrganizers:\nJulien PRAT (CREST) \nSponsors:\nCREST \n
URL:https://econ.ip-paris.fr/event/andrea-canidio-imt-school-of-advanced-studies-lucca-italy-auctions-with-tokens/
CATEGORIES:Macroeconomics
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=:
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR