Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 05/04/2023
Salle : 3001

BLOCH Francis (PSE) – “Attack and interception in networks” (with B Dutta and K Chatterjee)

CV : This paper studies a game of attack and interception in a network, where a single attacker chooses a  target and a path, and each node chooses a level of protection. We show that the Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique. We characterize equilibrium attack paths and attack distributions as a function of the underlying network and target values. We show that adding a link or increasing the value of a target may harm the attacker – a comparative statics effect which is reminiscent of Braess’s paradox in transportation economics. Finally, we contrast the Nash equilibrium with the equilibria of two variations of the model: one where all nodes cooperate in interception and one where nodes update their beliefs and make inspection decisions upon observing the arrival of a suspicious object.

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :
CREST