BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Department of Economics | IP Paris - ECPv5.1.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics | IP Paris
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://econ.ip-paris.fr
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics | IP Paris
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/Helsinki
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0300
TZNAME:EEST
DTSTART:20190331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0300
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
TZNAME:EET
DTSTART:20191027T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20190417T001500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20190417T133000
DTSTAMP:20241004T180846
CREATED:20190319T144938Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20190319T144938Z
UID:12237-1555460100-1555507800@econ.ip-paris.fr
SUMMARY:Phil Reny (Chicago) - "Conditional ε-Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions"
DESCRIPTION:CREST Microeconomics Seminar : \n\nTime: 12:15 pm – 1:30pm\nDate: 17rd April 2019\nPlace: Room 3001.\nPhil Reny (Chicago) – “Conditional ε-Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions” with Roger Myerson \nAbstract: We extend Kreps and Wilson’s concept of sequential equilibrium to games where the sets of actions that players can choose from and the sets of signals that players may observe are infinite. A strategy profile is a conditional ε-equilibrium if\, for any player and for any of his positive probability signal events\, the player’s conditional expected utility is within ε of the best that the player can achieve by deviating. Perfect conditional ε-equilibria are defined by testing conditional ε-rationality also under nets of small perturbations of the players’ strategies and of nature’s probability function that can make any finite collection of signals outside a negligible set have positive probability. Every perfect conditional ε-equilibrium strategy profile is a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium\, and\, in finite games\, limits of perfect conditional ε-equilibria as ε→0 are sequential equilibrium strategy profiles. Because such limit strategies need not exist even in very “nice” infinite games\, we consider instead their limit distributions over outcomes. We call such outcome distributions perfect conditional equilibrium distributions and establish their existence for a large class of regular projective games. Nature’s perturbations can produce equilibria that seem unintuitive and so we consider two ways to limit the effects of those perturbations\, using topologies on nature’s states and on players’ actions. \n\n\nOrganizers:\nRoxana Fernandez Machado (CREST)\, Marie Laure Allain (CREST)\, and Linda Schilling (CREST)\nSponsors:\nCREST\nLunch registration:\nfood provided\, no registration needed\n\n \n
URL:https://econ.ip-paris.fr/event/phil-reny-chicago-tba/
CATEGORIES:Microeconomics
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR