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X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics | IP Paris
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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics | IP Paris
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DTSTART:20250330T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250304T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20250304T180000
DTSTAMP:20260408T210604
CREATED:20250218T144250Z
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UID:15718-1741105800-1741111200@econ.ip-paris.fr
SUMMARY:Seminar "Mothers' Preferences to Care for a Child at Home"
DESCRIPTION:\nSpeaker\nLéa Dubreuil\, PhD Candidate in Economics at CREST\, specialised in Labor Economics\, Gender Inequality\, Economics of the Family. \nAbstract\nMotherhood stands out as the primary determinant of gender inequality. Following childbirth\, gender inequality surges as mothers are more likely to reduce their working hours or exit the labor market than fathers. While numerous policies\, such as childcare subsidies\, aim to reduce this child penalty\, their design overlooks maternal childcare preferences: a significant share of the child penalty could be attributed to mothers preferring to reduce their working hours to care for their child. Disregarding preferences might obscure substantial heterogeneity in mothers’ labor supply\, potentially leading to an underestimate of the labor supply responses of mothers who want to work. This could explain why the literature finds a limited impact of family policies on mothers’ labor supply. We first develop a model of women’s labor supply decisions\, incorporating preferences to care for a child at home. Based on this model\, we design an original survey to elicit mother’s preferences. This survey explores factors that may influence these preferences\, such as social norms or bargaining power within the couple. Finally\, we elicit mothers’ labor supply responses to different family policies to determine if behaviors differ between mothers with strong versus weak preferences. \nThis project is co-written with Marion Brouard. \nLink to the seminar: Mothers’ Preferences to Care for a Child at Home and Maternal Labor Supply | Sciences Po \n\n
URL:https://econ.ip-paris.fr/event/seminar-mothers-preferences-to-care-for-a-child-at-home/
CATEGORIES:Conferences and Workshops,Economics
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