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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20240112T121500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Helsinki:20240112T133000
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UID:15229-1705061700-1705066200@econ.ip-paris.fr
SUMMARY:Sulagna Dasgupta (Chicago)  "Screening Knowledge”
DESCRIPTION:Micro Seminar \nTime: 12:15 pm – 13:30 pm\nDate: 11th of January\nRoom : 3001 \nSulagna Dasgupta (Chicago) “Screening Knowledge” \n  \nAbstract :A principal (she) tests an agent’s (he) knowledge of a subject matter. She has preferences over his unobserved quality\, which is correlated with his knowledge. Modeling knowledge as beliefs over an unknown state\, I show that optimal tests are simple: They take the form of True-False\, weighted True-False or True-False-Unsure\, regardless of the principal’s preferences\, the distribution of the agent’s beliefs\, its correlation with his quality or his knowledge thereof. The need to elicit knowledge forces the principal to trade-off the efficacy of the test in terms of whom it rewards\, against how much it rewards them. The optimal resolution of this trade-off may lead to a partial penalty for an “obvious” answer even if it is correct\, a partial reward for a “counter-intuitive” answer even if it is incorrect\, or a reward for admitting ignorance. When the principal can pick the subject matter\, she picks one that admits no such obvious answers. In this case\, the highly prevalent True-False test is always optimal\, regardless of principal’s preferences\, agent’s learning\, or the specific optimal choice of the subject matter. \n  \nOrganizers: Yukio Koriyama\n \n
URL:https://econ.ip-paris.fr/event/sulagna-dasgupta-chicago-screening-knowledge/
CATEGORIES:Micro Seminar,Seminars
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