CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00 pm Date: 08th May 2019 Place: Room 3105. Rafael Veiel - "Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability" Abstract: In games of incomplete information Interim rationalizability is the equilibrium concept that stems from iterative deletion of dominated strategies. It is known that […]
CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00 pm Date: 08th May 2019 Place: Room 3105. Rafael Veiel - "Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability" Abstract: In games of incomplete information Interim rationalizability is the equilibrium concept that stems from iterative deletion of dominated strategies. It is known that […]
CREST Microeconomics Seminar : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 15th April 2019 Place: Room 3105. Linda Schilling - "Too many voters to fail" Abstract: Bank failures and subsequent bank resolutions are politically important events. Politicians are sensitive to outcomes of bank resolution especially during election time when bank investors at risk of losing money […]
CREST Microeconomics Seminar : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 15th April 2019 Place: Room 3105. Linda Schilling - "Too many voters to fail" Abstract: Bank failures and subsequent bank resolutions are politically important events. Politicians are sensitive to outcomes of bank resolution especially during election time when bank investors at risk of losing money […]
CREST Microeconomics Seminar : Time: 11:00 pm - 12:00pm Date: 20th May 2019 Place: Room 3105. Michael Visser - "Are Jury Decisions Interrelated? Evidence from the Labor Court of Paris" Abstract: This paper analyzes what are the determinants of decisions taken by juries at labor courts. These juries decide how much money defendants (employers) should […]
CREST Microeconomics Seminar : Time: 11:00 pm - 12:00pm Date: 20th May 2019 Place: Room 3105. Michael Visser - "Are Jury Decisions Interrelated? Evidence from the Labor Court of Paris" Abstract: This paper analyzes what are the determinants of decisions taken by juries at labor courts. These juries decide how much money defendants (employers) should […]
CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 27th May 2019 Place: Room 3105. Rémi Avignon - "Buying Groups and Product Variety" Abstract: We study the impact of retailers' buying groups on both product variety and the profit sharing within the vertical chain. We consider a setting in which capacity constrained […]
CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 27th May 2019 Place: Room 3105. Rémi Avignon - "Buying Groups and Product Variety" Abstract: We study the impact of retailers' buying groups on both product variety and the profit sharing within the vertical chain. We consider a setting in which capacity constrained […]
CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 03rd June 2019 Place: Room 3105. Morgane Cure - "Price determinants and the effect of price parity in the hotel industry" Abstract: Using an exhaustive database of bookings in 22 hotels of one large chain active in Scandinavia (2014-2015), we estimate a price […]
CREST Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 03rd June 2019 Place: Room 3105. Morgane Cure - "Price determinants and the effect of price parity in the hotel industry" Abstract: Using an exhaustive database of bookings in 22 hotels of one large chain active in Scandinavia (2014-2015), we estimate a price […]
Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 17th June 2019 Place: Room 3105. David Benatia - "Strategic Reneging in Sequential Imperfect Markets" Abstract: This paper investigates the incentives to manipulate sequential markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. First, we study the behavior of a monopolist in a two-period model with […]
Internal Seminar in Microeconomics : Time: 11:00 am - 12:00pm Date: 17th June 2019 Place: Room 3105. David Benatia - "Strategic Reneging in Sequential Imperfect Markets" Abstract: This paper investigates the incentives to manipulate sequential markets by strategically reneging on forward commitments. First, we study the behavior of a monopolist in a two-period model with […]