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Iris Kesternich (KU Leuven) – "Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 12:15pm - 1:30pm Date:  9th June 2021 Room: VISIO Iris Kesternich (KU Leuven) - "Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market" Abstract: Mostly due to population aging, the demand for long-term care (LTC) services is growing strongly. Historically, non-profit nursing homes dominated the German LTC market, but […]

Iris Kesternich (KU Leuven) – "Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 12:15pm - 1:30pm Date:  9th June 2021 Room: VISIO Iris Kesternich (KU Leuven) - "Entry decisions and asymmetric competition between non-profit and for-profit homes in the long-term care market" Abstract: Mostly due to population aging, the demand for long-term care (LTC) services is growing strongly. Historically, non-profit nursing homes dominated the German LTC market, but […]

Daniel Waldinger (NYU) – "Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 4:00pm - 5:15pm Date:  16th June 2021 Room: VISIO Daniel Waldinger (NYU) - "Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation" Abstract: Public housing benefits are rationed through waitlists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying […]

Daniel Waldinger (NYU) – "Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 4:00pm - 5:15pm Date:  16th June 2021 Room: VISIO Daniel Waldinger (NYU) - "Targeting In-Kind Transfers Through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation" Abstract: Public housing benefits are rationed through waitlists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying […]

Thomas Mariotti (TSE) – "Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 2:15pm - 3:30pm Date:  23th June 2021 Room: VISIO Thomas Mariotti (TSE) - "Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs" Abstract: We study the optimal investment policy of a firm facing both technological and cash-flow uncertainty. At any point in time, the firm can decide to invest in a stand-alone technology or to wait […]

Thomas Mariotti (TSE) – "Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 2:15pm - 3:30pm Date:  23th June 2021 Room: VISIO Thomas Mariotti (TSE) - "Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs" Abstract: We study the optimal investment policy of a firm facing both technological and cash-flow uncertainty. At any point in time, the firm can decide to invest in a stand-alone technology or to wait […]

Lori Beaman (Northwestern) – "Selection into Credit Markets: Evidence from Agriculture in Mali "

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 3:00pm - 4:15pm Date:  30th June 2021 Room: VISIO Lori Beaman (Northwestern)  - "Selection into Credit Markets: Evidence from Agriculture in Mali" Abstract: We use a two-stage experiment on agricultural lending in Mali to test whether selection into lending is predictive of heterogeneous returns to capital. Understanding this heterogeneity, and the selection […]

Lori Beaman (Northwestern) – "Selection into Credit Markets: Evidence from Agriculture in Mali "

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 3:00pm - 4:15pm Date:  30th June 2021 Room: VISIO Lori Beaman (Northwestern)  - "Selection into Credit Markets: Evidence from Agriculture in Mali" Abstract: We use a two-stage experiment on agricultural lending in Mali to test whether selection into lending is predictive of heterogeneous returns to capital. Understanding this heterogeneity, and the selection […]

Utku Unver (Boston College) – "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 3:00pm - 4:15pm Date:  15th of September 2021 Room: VISIO Utku Unver (Boston College) - "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences" Abstract: In 56 developing and developed countries, blood component donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of the demand. In […]

Utku Unver (Boston College) – "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences"

Microeconomics Seminar :  Time: 3:00pm - 4:15pm Date:  15th of September 2021 Room: VISIO Utku Unver (Boston College) - "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences" Abstract: In 56 developing and developed countries, blood component donations by volunteer non-remunerated donors can only meet less than 50% of the demand. In […]

Vincent Anesi (University of Luxembourg) – “Screening for Consensus: Delegation with Collective Principals » (joint with Peter Buisseret).”

Microeconomics Seminar: Every Wednesday Time: 12:15 pm - 13:30 pm Date: 23th of March 2022 Room : 3001 Vincent ANESI (University of Luxembourg) - "TBA" Abstract:   Organizers: Julien COMBE (Pôle d'économie du CREST) Roxana FERNANDEZ (Pôle d'économie du CREST) Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d'économie du CREST) Sponsors: CREST

Francesco SQUINTAN (University of Warwick) “Optimal Overspecified Contracts”

Microeconomics Seminar: Every Wednesday Time: 12:15 pm - 13:30 pm Date: 30th of March 2022 Room : 3001 Francesco SQUINTANI (University of Warwick) - "Optimal Overspecified Contracts" Abstract: This paper identifies situations where desired outcomes may only be implemented with the stipulation of `overspecified contracts', defined as contracts that include clauses that are not enforceable. The […]