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Paula ONUCHIC (University of Oxford) – “Disclosure and Incentives in Teams”

June 12 @ 12:15 pm - 1:30 pm

Séminaire Microéconomie : Tous les mercredis
Heure : 12h15 – 13h30
Date : 12/06/2024
Salle : 3001

Paula ONUCHIC (University of Oxford) – “Disclosure and Incentives in Teams”

CV : We consider a team production environment augmented by a stage in which the team decides how to communicate its productive outcome to outside observers. In this context, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team outcomes when team disclosure choices aggregate individual recommendations through some deliberation procedure. We show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure of the team’s outcome and establish a relation between the deliberation procedure and the observer’s equilibrium attribution of blame for non-disclosed outcomes (“team failures”) across team members. We show that through this blame-attribution channel a team’s deliberation procedure determines individuals’ incentives to contribute effort to team production. We then characterize deliberation procedures that provide strong effort incentives in different productive environments

Organisateurs :

Julien COMBE (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​​​​Yves Le YAOUNQ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)
​​​​​​​​​Matias NUNEZ (Pôle d’Economie du CREST)

Commanditaires :